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How do people judge the similarity of words, objects, 
or ideas? Despite concerns about its usefulness as a con-
struct (Goodman, 1972), similarity remains the focus of 
much psychological research, perhaps because our sense 
of similarity seems intimately linked with our capacity 
to generalize, to form categories, and to individuate con-
cepts (Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner, 1993). This article 
investigates the relationship between similarity and spa-
tial proximity that is suggested by linguistic metaphors. 
In English (and many other languages), speakers often 
talk about similarity by using words and expressions that 
describe spatial relations. Things that are similar along 
nearly any dimension can be described as close, and things 
that are dissimilar as far apart. For example,
1. a. These two shades of blue aren’t identical, but
 they’re close.
 b. The opposing candidates’ stances on the issue
 couldn’t be farther apart.
Does the way people talk about similarity reveal something 
fundamental about the way they conceptualize it? According 
to conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 
1999), metaphors in language (e.g., a long time, a deep love, 
a high price) reveal that many of our abstract concepts de-
pend, in part, on a few simpler concepts grounded directly in 
perceptuomotor experience. Our notion of similarity is ab-
stract, like our ideas of time, love, or value, insomuch as it is 
(1) vaguely and variably defined, (2) highly context depen-
dent, and (3) mentalistic, lacking a concrete referent in the 
physical world that can be perceived through the senses.
Conceptual metaphor theorists posit a functional distinc-
tion between concrete source domains such as space, force, 
and motion, which we can experience through sensory 
perception and motor action, and more abstract target do-
mains, which we can experience only through interoception 
or introspection. A cross-domain mapping from a source 
domain to a target domain can be notated target is source 
(e.g., similarity is proximity) or alternatively, source  tar-
get (e.g., proximity  similarity) (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 
In metaphorical language, the target domain is lexicalized 
by borrowing words or constructions from the source do-
main. But importantly, by hypothesis, these source–target 
mappings are not constituted by words; rather, linguistic 
metaphors are manifestations of nonlinguistic mappings 
between conceptual or perceptual domains.
The terms metaphor, metaphorical mapping, and con-
ceptual metaphor are often used ambiguously, even by 
metaphor theorists: Sometimes these terms refer to struc-
tures in language, and other times to nonlinguistic mental 
representations. This ambiguity complicates any discus-
sion of the relationship between metaphorical language 
and metaphorical thinking. I will distinguish the linguistic 
and nonlinguistic components of conceptual metaphors by 
using the terms linguistic metaphor to refer to words and 
expressions in language and mental metaphor to refer to 
the associations between nonlinguistic source and target 
domains that are hypothesized to underlie linguistic meta-
phors. The notations target is source and source  target 
will refer to mental metaphors.
Despite the prominence of conceptual metaphor and re-
lated theories in the cognitive linguistics literature, relatively 
few behavioral studies have explored the psychological re-
ality of mental metaphors (Murphy, 1996, 1997), and even 
fewer studies have tested whether people use mental meta-
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these mental domains. Information in one domain can 
then be used heuristically as an index of the other. In 
particular, information in the more concrete, perceptu-
ally available domain can be used to support inferences 
in the more abstract domain (e.g., spatial information is 
used heuristically to support inferences about similarity). 
A directed connection between habitually coactivated 
mental representations of proximity and similarity could 
be implemented at a neural level by a process such as 
Hebbian learning (Hebb, 1949). On this view, similarity 
relationships are not merely analogous to spatial relation-
ships. Rather, once a cross-domain mapping has been es-
tablished, spatiomotor representations that can be used 
for reasoning about physical spatial relationships are also 
activated automatically to support reasoning in abstract, 
nonspatial domains such as similarity (Casasanto, in 
press; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 
2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).1
The mental metaphor proximity  similarity figures 
prominently in Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) exposition 
of conceptual metaphor theory. They choose this example 
to illustrate the relationship between source and target 
domains (p. 58) and to argue that without such cross-
 domain mappings, abstract thought is “virtually impossi-
ble” (p. 59). There is compelling evidence that people talk 
about similarity using spatial words, but do people use the 
corresponding spatial schemas to reason about similarity 
even when they are not producing or understanding lan-
guage? This question cannot in principle be addressed on 
the basis of linguistic or psycholinguistic data alone.
The experiments reported here tested the hypothesis 
that our notion of similarity depends in part on mental rep-
resentations of physical distance, as predicted by spatial 
metaphors for similarity in language and by the proposed 
mental metaphor proximity  similarity. Lakoff and John-
son (1999, p. 59) analyzed this mental metaphor into two 
complementary mappings: spatial closeness  similarity, 
and spatial distance  dissimilarity, which are predicted 
on the basis of expressions in language such as 1a and 1b 
above. The present experiments tested whether these cross-
domain mappings are also evident in explicit similarity 
judgments about both linguistic and nonlinguistic stimuli. 
In three experiments, participants rated the similarity of 
pairs of words or pictures, which were presented at varying 
distances on the computer screen (e.g., close, medium, or 
far apart). Across participants, a given stimulus pair ap-
peared an equal number of times at each spatial distance. 
If the spatial relationships encoded in linguistic metaphors 
are automatically activated during the process of evaluating 
similarity—whether or not evaluations involve linguistic 
stimuli or responses—the participants should judge stimuli 
to be more similar when they are presented closer together 
on the screen than when they are presented farther apart.
ExpErimEnt 1 
Abstract nouns
Experiment 1 tested whether participants would rate pairs 
of abstract nouns to be more similar in meaning when they 
appeared closer together on the screen than when they ap-
phors when they are not using language (cf. Casasanto & 
Boroditsky, 2008). Yet metaphor theory may be of critical 
importance for advancing embodied theories of mental rep-
resentation in psychology and cognitive neuroscience (e.g., 
Barsalou, 1999). Theories of embodied cognition, such as 
Barsalou’s perceptual symbol systems, posit that concepts 
are constituted, at least in part, by mental simulations of our 
perceptions and actions. The results of numerous experi-
ments are consistent with this proposal (e.g., Borghi, 2004; 
Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Tucker & Ellis, 2004; Zwaan 
& Yaxley, 2003), suggesting that mental representations of 
concrete objects and actions comprise partial recapitulations 
of perceptuomotor experiences. Abstract concepts, however, 
present a serious challenge for embodied theories: Thinking 
about concrete objects and actions may involve perceptuo-
motor simulations, but how can we perceptually simulate 
things that we can never perceive? Metaphor theory pro-
vides a potential answer: To the extent that perceptuomotor 
schemas constitute the content of abstract concepts, these 
concepts can be instantiated by the same neural and mental 
structures that simulate perception and action in the physi-
cal world. Within cognitive linguistics, embodiment theory 
and metaphor theory appear to be mutually inextricable 
(e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Proponents of embodied 
cognition in other areas of cognitive science, however, have 
marginalized the role of metaphor in the mental represen-
tation of abstract concepts (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou 
& Wiemer- Hastings, 2005; Prinz, 2002). Barsalou, for ex-
ample, argues that “a direct, non-metaphorical representa-
tion of an abstract domain is essential” and proposes that 
“perceptual symbol systems can represent all abstract con-
cepts directly” (p. 600). This stance is somewhat surprising, 
since mental metaphors seem a likely component of the so-
lution to the problem of representing the imperceptible via 
perceptuomotor simulations. A goal of the present article 
is to provide two necessary precursors to the incorporation 
of metaphor into psychological theories of embodied cog-
nition: an explicit proposal for how (at least some) mental 
metaphors are created and a method for testing the activation 
of a particular mental metaphor that uses both linguistic and 
nonlinguistic stimuli and responses.
Mental metaphors linking concrete and abstract do-
mains may become established as we implicitly track use-
ful correlations in our physical experience (Casasanto, 
in press; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). For example, 
the mental metaphor proximity  similarity could plau-
sibly arise as we implicitly learn that, in both the natural 
and the human-made environment, more similar things 
tend to be found closer together in space, and less similar 
things farther apart (imagine the clustering of wildflow-
ers in a field, the categorization of books in a library, 
or the arrangement of products on supermarket shelves). 
This pattern in which similar things tend to clump to-
gether in space was noted by the Gestalt psychologists 
(e.g., Wertheimer, 1923/1938) and by linguists interested 
in relationships among language, concepts, and space 
(Jackendoff, 1983; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Over time, 
as we perceive and act upon our “clumpy” environment, 
we habitually coactivate information about space and 
similarity, giving rise to a functional connection between 
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150 pixels in the close condition, 300 pixels in the medium condition, 
and 450 pixels in the far condition. Distance between the stimuli was 
manipulated within subjects: For each participant, one third of the 
word pairs appeared at each of the three distances. The participants 
saw each word pair only once, and the assignment of word pairs to 
distance conditions was counterbalanced across participants.
In order to reduce demand characteristics of the task, the close, 
medium, and far picture frames appeared in one of four different 
positions on the far left, middle left, middle right, or far right of the 
screen. Within each distance condition (i.e., close, medium, and far), 
an equal number of stimulus pairs was randomly assigned to each of 
the left–right positions. As a result, there was a total of 12 different 
configurations of picture frames. The midpoint between the picture 
frames was on the left side of the screen for half of the trials and on 
the right side for the other half. Variation in the left–right position of 
the stimuli was orthogonal to the variation in distance between them 
and, thus, provided a highly salient filler variable.
At the beginning of each trial, two empty picture frames appeared 
simultaneously and remained visible until the end of the trial. After 
500 msec, the first word of each pair appeared in the left picture 
frame for 2,000 msec and then disappeared. After a 500-msec in-
terstimulus interval, the second word of the pair appeared in the 
right picture frame for 2,000 msec.2 As soon as the second word 
disappeared, a response prompt and the 9-point scale appeared, and 
peared presented farther apart. Abstract nouns (e.g., grief, 
justice, hope) were chosen as stimuli for this first test of the 
relationship between similarity and proximity because their 
meanings are notoriously vague and context dependent; 
therefore, judgments of their similarity in meaning may be 
particularly susceptible to the influence of task-irrelevant 
variations in the spatial distance between stimuli.
method
participants. Twenty-seven native English speakers from the Stan-
ford University community participated in exchange for payment.
materials. Seventy-two abstract nouns (concreteness rat-
ing , 400) between 4 and 10 letters long were selected from the 
MRC Psycholinguistic Database. The nouns were randomly com-
bined into 36 pairs (e.g., grief–justice, memory–hope, sympathy–
loyalty; see Appendix A). Words were presented on an iMac monitor 
(1,024 3 768 pixel resolution) in 14-point Courier font.
Design and procedure. The participants viewed all 36 word pairs 
in randomized order and rated their similarity in meaning (i.e., “How 
similar in meaning?”) on a scale from 1 (not at all similar) to 9 (very 
similar). Each word appeared centered within one of two “picture 
frames” (150 pixels wide, 50 pixels high) on the vertical midline of 
the screen. The centers of the frames were separated horizontally by 
pride
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of the trial structure for Experiment 1 (close condition).
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in length, two shirts can be close in size, and two faces 
can be close in appearance. The relationship between simi-
larity and proximity in linguistic metaphors generalizes 
broadly (so broadly, in fact, that it is difficult to imagine 
a case in which similarity cannot be described in terms 
of closeness). The same linguistic metaphor can describe 
similarity along both conceptual and perceptual dimen-
sions. Therefore, if people conceptualize similarity the way 
they talk about it, the same prediction about the relation-
ship between similarity and proximity should hold for both 
conceptual judgments about abstract entities and percep-
tual judgments about more concrete entities.
For Experiment 2, the participants judged the similarity 
of pairs of unfamiliar faces. Whereas the participants in 
Experiment 1 were instructed to judge similarity of ab-
stract words on the basis of their meanings, the partici-
pants in Experiment 2 were instructed to judge similarity 
of faces based on their visual appearance (i.e., “How sim-
ilar in appearance?”), on a scale from 1 (not at all similar) 
to 9 (very similar).
method
participants. Thirty-three native English speakers from the MIT 
community participated in exchange for payment.
materials and procedure. Sixty pairs of unfamiliar faces were 
constructed from a database of University of Pennsylvania ID card 
photos. Half were male–male pairs, and half were female–female 
pairs. The face pairs were presented exactly as the word pairs had 
been presented in Experiment 1, with the following exception: The 
height of the “picture frames” was changed to accommodate the size 
of the photos (150 pixels wide 3 200 pixels high).
results and Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 showed that stimuli were 
judged to be more similar when they were presented far-
ther apart than when they were presented closer together, 
contrary to predictions based on spatial metaphors for 
similarity in language. Average similarity ratings were 
3.87 (SE 5 0.06) in the close condition, 4.01 (SE 5 0.07) 
in the medium condition, and 4.18 (SE 5 0.07) in the 
the participants responded by pressing a number key on a standard 
keyboard (see Figure 1). Responses were self-paced.
results and Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 showed that stimuli were 
judged to be more similar when they were presented 
closer together than when they were farther apart. Aver-
age similarity ratings were 3.80 (SE 5 0.19) in the close 
condition, 3.33 (SE 5 0.12) in the medium condition, and 
3.28 (SE 5 0.15) in the far condition. Ratings were nor-
malized by participants (for analysis by participants) and 
by items (for analysis by items), and Z-scored similarity 
ratings were compared using a one-way ANOVA (see Fig-
ure 2).3 Ratings differed significantly across conditions, 
both by participants [F1(2,52) 5 3.45, p 5 .04] and by 
items [F2(2,105) 5 4.49, p 5 .02].
One possibility is that the influence of spatial proximity 
may have been restricted to low-similarity items, for which 
word meanings were difficult to compare. To address this 
concern, an analysis was conducted to determine whether 
the relationship between proximity and similarity differed 
for items that were judged to have high similarity (e.g., 
sympathy–love) versus low similarity (e.g., deduction–
glory). Items were mean-split according to their overall 
similarity ratings. A two-way ANOVA showed no signifi-
cant interaction of similarity (high or low) and distance 
(close, medium, or far) [F(2,102) 5 1.90, n.s.]; thus, the 
effect of distance on similarity ratings did not differ be-
tween high- and low-similarity word pairs.
The finding that stimuli were rated more similar when 
presented closer together is consistent with predictions 
based on conceptual metaphor theory. A further concern 
in interpreting these results was that perhaps they were 
consistent with predictions based on linguistic metaphors 
only because the stimuli were (1) linguistic and (2) highly 
abstract. Would the same pattern of results be found for 
similarity judgments on nonlinguistic stimuli that have 
more concrete, perceptible features? This question was 
addressed in Experiments 2 and 3.
ExpErimEnt 2 
Unfamiliar Faces
Experiment 2 tested whether the results of Experiment 1 
would generalize to a different type of stimulus, for which 
similarity had to be computed along different dimensions. 
To judge the similarity of abstract noun pairs, participants 
had to retrieve word meanings from memory and to reason 
about unseen properties of abstract entities. Because the 
appearance of words is arbitrarily related to their mean-
ing, the visual stimuli themselves provided little informa-
tion (if any) that was relevant to the similarity judgment. 
Would distance still influence similarity judgments, as in 
Experiment 1, even if more of the relevant information 
were given perceptually in the visual stimuli themselves? 
According to conceptual metaphor theory, it should.
People use spatial metaphors in language to describe 
similarities between abstract and concrete things alike. Just 
as two abstract words can be said to be close in meaning, 




























Figure 2. results of Experiment 1. Similarity ratings for pairs 
of abstract nouns varied significantly as a function of their spatial 
separation on the screen, which was consistent with predictions 
based on spatial metaphors for similarity in language. Error bars 
indicate standard errors of the means.
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judgments in Experiment 3 should resemble those in Ex-
periment 2, in which pictorial stimuli were used: Closer 
stimuli should be judged to be less similar, regardless of 
the type of judgment the participants made. This outcome 
would yield a main effect of distance (close or far) but no 
interaction of distance and judgment type (perceptual or 
conceptual). Alternatively, if the difference between re-
sults of the first two experiments was due to the partici-
pants’ judging abstract, unseen properties of the stimuli in 
Experiment 1 but judging concrete, perceptible properties 
of the stimuli in Experiment 2, then in the present experi-
ment, the results of conceptual judgments should be simi-
lar to those in Experiment 1 (i.e., closer stimuli should be 
judged more similar), whereas the results of perceptual 
judgments should be similar to those in Experiment 2 (i.e., 
closer stimuli should be judged less similar). This out-
come would yield an interaction of distance (close or far) 
and judgment type (perceptual or conceptual).
method
participants. Eighty native English speakers from the MIT com-
munity participated in Experiment 3 in exchange for payment. Forty 
participants were randomly assigned to the conceptual judgment 
condition, and the other 40 to the perceptual judgment condition.
materials and procedure. Thirty pairs of objects were con-
structed from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) line drawings. 
Objects were paired only within semantic categories (e.g., tools, 
clothing, furniture) to facilitate meaningful judgments of functional 
similarity in the conceptual judgment condition (see Appendix B). 
The participants viewed all 30 object pairs in randomized order. The 
participants assigned to the conceptual judgment condition rated 
their functional similarity (i.e., “How similar in function or use?”) 
on a scale from 1 (not at all similar) to 9 (very similar), whereas 
the participants assigned to the perceptual judgment condition rated 
their visual similarity (i.e., “How similar in visual appearance?”) on 
the same scale. Object pairs appeared in “picture frames” (150 pixels 
wide 3 200 pixels high) and were presented exactly as in the previ-
ous experiment, with the following exceptions: The stimuli appeared 
at one of two distances on the screen (instead of three), without the 
orthogonal left–right variation in position used previously, in order 
to maximize the difference between the close condition (in which the 
centers of pictures were separated by 150 pixels) and the far condi-
tion (in which the centers of pictures were separated by 600 pixels). 
Distance between stimuli was manipulated within subjects, and the 
assignment of picture pairs to distance conditions was counterbal-
anced across participants.
results and Discussion
The results showed that during conceptual judgments, 
closer stimuli were judged to be more similar. Average 
similarity ratings were 6.15 (SE 5 0.04) in the close condi-
tion and 5.97 (SE 5 0.04) in the far condition. By contrast, 
during perceptual judgments, closer stimuli were judged 
to be less similar. Average similarity ratings were 5.12 
(SE 5 0.04) in the close condition and 5.28 (SE 5 0.04) 
in the far condition. Similarity ratings were normalized 
by participants (for analysis by participants) and by items 
(for analysis by items), and Z-scored ratings were com-
pared using a two-way ANOVA (see Figure 4). A mixed 
ANOVA with distance (close or far) as a within-subjects 
factor and judgment type (perceptual or conceptual) as a 
between-subjects factor showed a significant interaction 
by participants [F1(1,78) 5 12.23, p 5 .001]. This signifi-
far condition. Ratings were normalized by participants 
(for analysis by participants) and by items (for analysis 
by items), and Z-scored similarity ratings were compared 
using a one-way ANOVA (Figure 3). Ratings differed sig-
nificantly across conditions (although not in the predicted 
direction), both by participants [F1(2,64) 5 3.61, p 5 .04] 
and by items [F2(2,177) 5 3.29, p 5 .04].
As for Experiment 1, an analysis was conducted to de-
termine whether the relationship between proximity and 
similarity differed overall for items that were judged to 
have high similarity versus low similarity. Items were 
mean-split according to their overall similarity ratings. 
A two-way ANOVA showed no significant interaction of 
similarity (high or low) and distance (close, medium, or 
far) [F(2,174) 5 1.18, n.s.]; thus, the effect of distance on 




Why did proximity have opposite effects on similar-
ity ratings for abstract nouns and unfamiliar faces? Ex-
periments 1 and 2 differed both in the kind of stimulus 
the participants judged (i.e., verbal vs. pictorial) and in 
the kind of judgments they made (i.e., conceptual judg-
ments based on meaning vs. perceptual judgments based 
on visual appearance). Experiment 3 evaluated whether 
the results of Experiments 1 and 2 differed because of the 
type of stimulus or the type of judgment.
For Experiment 3, different judgments were made on 
the same set of stimulus pictures, which depicted com-
mon objects. Half of the participants were instructed to 
judge their similarity in visual appearance (a perceptual 
judgment), and the other half to judge their similarity in 
function or use (a conceptual judgment). If the contrast 
between the results of Experiments 1 and 2 was due to 
a difference in the type of experimental materials used, 
























Figure 3. results of Experiment 2. Similarity ratings for pairs 
of faces varied significantly as a function of their spatial separa-
tion on the screen, but contrary to predictions based on spatial 
metaphors for similarity in language. Error bars indicate stan-
dard errors of the means.
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nouns versus faces [difference 5 .44; t(58) 5 3.41, p 5 
.001], perceptual object judgments versus conceptual 
object judgments [difference 5 .19; t(78) 5 3.57, p 5 
.001], and conceptual object judgments versus faces [dif-
ference 5 .26; t(71) 5 3.98, p 5 .0001]. Importantly, no 
differences were found between the effects of proximity 
on similarity ratings for abstract nouns versus conceptual 
object judgments [difference 5 .18; t(65) 5 1.62, n.s.] 
or for perceptual object judgments versus faces [differ-
ence 5 .07; t(71) 5 1.14, n.s.]. In summary, this analysis 
shows that all pairwise comparisons between judgment 
types (conceptual vs. perceptual) yielded highly signifi-
cant differences, whereas pairwise comparisons within 
judgment types yielded no significant differences.
Together, the results of Experiment 3 and of the com-
parative analysis indicate that the contrasting effects of 
proximity on similarity judgments found in Experiments 1 
and 2 were not due to superficial differences between 
the verbal and the pictorial stimuli. Rather, the effect of 
proximity on similarity depends on the kind of judgment 
participants make: conceptual judgments about abstract 
entities or unseen object properties versus perceptual 
judgments about visible stimulus properties.
In addition, this overall pattern of results helps to ad-
dress any residual concerns regarding the demand char-
acteristics of the tasks. It is plausible, a priori, that the 
participants may have become aware of the proximity 
manipulation and focused their attention on it despite the 
highly salient variation in the left–right position of the 
stimuli, which was orthogonal to the variation in their spa-
tial separation (see the Method section in Experiment 1). 
If the participants noticed that some stimuli appeared 
closer together than others, they could have consciously 
accessed the association between similarity and proxim-
ity found in linguistic metaphors. This could potentially 
account for the results for the conceptual similarity judg-
ments, which were consistent with spatial metaphors for 
similarity in language, but this explanation cannot account 
for the results for the perceptual judgments, in which the 
effect of distance on similarity judgments ran contrary to 
linguistic metaphors. Furthermore, in order to explain the 
interaction of distance and judgment type in Experiment 3 
in terms of demand characteristics, it would be necessary 
to explain why the participants imputed different experi-
mental demands during conceptual judgments versus per-
ceptual judgments on the same stimuli.
GEnErAl DiSCUSSiOn
Experiments 1–3 tested whether similarity ratings for 
words and pictures vary as a function of how far apart 
stimuli appear on a computer screen. The results showed 
that spatial proximity influenced similarity judgments sig-
nificantly in all the experiments, but the direction of influ-
ence varied according to the type of judgment the partici-
pants made. Closer stimuli were rated more similar during 
conceptual judgments of abstract entities or unseen object 
properties but less similar during perceptual judgments 
of the visual appearance of faces and objects. Conceptual 
judgments followed predictions based on linguistic meta-
cant interaction was confirmed in a two-way ANOVA by 
items [F2(1,116) 5 12.12, p 5 .001].
An additional analysis was performed to compare the 
effect of distance on similarity ratings for close versus 
far trials across Experiments 1, 2, and 3. The effect of 
proximity on similarity judgments for each experiment 
was defined as the difference between participants’ mean 
similarity ratings in the close and far conditions [effect of 
proximity on similarity 5 (mean of normalized similar-
ity ratings in the close condition) 2 (mean of normalized 
similarity ratings in the far condition)] and was compared 
across all the experiments, using a one-way ANOVA 
[F(3,136) 5 8.81, p 5 .0001; see Figure 5]. Two-tailed 
pairwise independent- samples t tests showed significant 
differences between the effects of proximity on similarity 
ratings for abstract nouns versus perceptual object judg-
































Figure 4. results of Experiment 3. Similarity ratings for pairs 
of object pictures varied significantly as a function of their spa-
tial separation on the screen. the relationship between proximity 
and similarity was consistent with predictions based on spatial 
metaphors for similarity in language during conceptual judg-
ments (left) but was inconsistent during perceptual judgments 




































Figure 5. Comparison of the effect of proximity on similarity 
ratings across experiments. Closer stimuli were rated more simi-
lar during conceptual judgments (left columns: Experiments 1 
and 3, conceptual judgment condition) but less similar during 
perceptual judgments (right columns: Experiment 3, perceptual 
judgment condition, and Experiment 2). Error bars indicate stan-
dard errors of the means.
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times bring their hands closer together in space to indi-
cate the similarity of abstract ideas during spontaneous 
cospeech gestures. Goldstone (1994) asked participants 
to arrange various tokens of the letter “A” on the com-
puter screen so that more similar tokens were positioned 
closer in space. Importantly, although, in principle, simi-
larity between tokens of the letter “A” could depend on the 
perceptual properties of the stimuli, Goldstone noted that 
when the participants were asked to indicate similarity via 
spatial proximity, they focused on “abstract commonali-
ties” between tokens (p. 385). Whereas the participants’ 
evaluations of the “A” stimuli were driven by perceptual 
similarity for nonspatial judgments (i.e., same/different 
judgments), instructing the participants to arrange stimuli 
according to the rule that closer 5 more similar led them 
to “tap into a level of similarity that is relatively cognitive 
rather than perceptual” (p. 385). This complex relation-
ship between spatial proximity, conceptual similarity, and 
perceptual similarity appears to have been unexpected in 
the Goldstone study, as it was in the present study.
It may be possible to account for the results of Experi-
ments 1–3 by positing that physical closeness influences 
our assessment of similarity in two contrasting ways 
(2a–2b):
2. a. Physical closeness encourages noticing percep-
 tible differences between stimuli.
 b. Physical closeness encourages construing stimuli
 as members of the same category.
Figure 6 illustrates that moving items closer together in 
space, even by a few centimeters, can dramatically increase 
the salience of simple perceptible differences that are hard 
to notice when the same items are presented farther apart.4 
In this way, proximity can make closer stimuli seem less 
similar. For more complex stimuli, proximity may encour-
age zooming in attention on fine-grained perceptual de-
tails that might not appear relevant when the same items 
are presented farther apart. These effects of proximity on 
similarity should be particularly relevant for making per-
ceptual judgments (as in Experiments 2 and 3, perceptual 
condition) but less relevant for making conceptual judg-
ments (as in Experiments 1 and 3, conceptual condition).
By contrast, proximity also encourages construing 
stimuli as members of the same category, and categoriz-
ing things together makes them seem more similar (Gold-
stone, Lippa, & Shiffrin, 2001). Relationships among sim-
ilarity, proximity, and category membership that are found 
in our environment may help to explain why construing 
phors that express similarity in terms of spatial proximity: 
When stimuli appeared closer in physical space, they were 
judged to be “closer” in participants’ mental similarity 
space, as well. Perceptual judgments showed the opposite 
pattern, however, contrary to predictions based on linguis-
tic metaphors for similarity. Overall, the results suggest 
that our notion of similarity depends, in part, on our expe-
rience of spatial distance, yet they also show that we can-
not necessarily infer the relationship between similarity 
and proximity in people’s nonlinguistic mental representa-
tions from patterns in metaphorical language alone.
Conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 
1999) cannot easily account for the difference between the 
effects of distance on perceptual versus conceptual judg-
ments, given that the same spatial metaphors can be used 
to describe similarities in both low-level perceptual prop-
erties and high-level conceptual properties: Similarities 
in appearance, function, or meaning can all be described 
using words like close and far. Linguistic metaphors sug-
gest that the same mental metaphor, proximity  similar-
ity, underlies our notions of both perceptual and conceptual 
similarity. Thus, language predicts that distance should 
have the same effect on perceptual and conceptual similar-
ity judgments, contrary to the results of Experiments 1–3.
Is it possible that conceptual metaphor can accommo-
date these data on a looser, higher level interpretation of the 
theory? The fact that every experiment showed significant 
effects of spatial distance on similarity judgments validates 
an important link between the similarity and space, so per-
haps these results should be considered consistent with a 
broader construal of metaphor theory. Perhaps, but this in-
terpretation is problematic. Conceptual metaphor does not 
predict just any relationship between similarity and space; it 
predicts two specific complementary relationships: spatial 
closeness  similarity and spatial distance  dissimilarity 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 59). Spatial closeness  dis-
similarity is not hypothesized to be a mental metaphor, and 
there is no corresponding linguistic metaphor: To say that 
two shades of blue are close when you mean that they are 
dissimilar would be either ironic or nonsensical.
If the present results are interpreted as validating con-
ceptual metaphor theory overall, then the theory is rendered 
too vague to make falsifiable behavioral predictions. On a 
more fruitful interpretation, metaphors in language remain 
a powerful predictor of relationships between nonlinguistic 
domains of knowledge in general; and behavioral results, 
such as those presented here, that systematically confirm 
or disconfirm predictions about conceptual structure that 
are based on linguistic metaphors will eventually help to 
clarify metaphor theory and establish its boundaries. Al-
though some null results have been reported previously 
(e.g., Bergen, Lindsay, Matlock, & Narayanan, 2007), data 
from Experiments 2 and 3 (perceptual judgment condi-
tion) may be the first experimental results to demonstrate 
significant effects that directly contradict predictions that 
follow from conceptual metaphor theory.
Like the results of Experiments 1 and 3 (conceptual 
judgment condition), previous studies have also shown 
positive associations between proximity and conceptual 
similarity. Sweetser (1997) observed that speakers some-
Figure 6. the vertical bars above the horizontal line are identi-
cal in length to the bars below the horizontal line. this figure 
demonstrates that proximity can facilitate noticing small differ-
ences along perceptual dimensions (e.g., height).
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It may be possible to integrate these contrasting influ-
ences of spatial proximity on conceptual and perceptual 
similarity judgments if the computation of similarity is 
considered to be a process of rational inference that op-
timally combines perceptible information at hand with 
stored knowledge of experiential regularities in the en-
vironment (Anderson, 1991; Shepard, 1987; Tenenbaum 
& Griffiths, 2001). Tenenbaum and Griffiths proposed 
a Bayesian model, according to which the similarity be-
tween two items is computed in terms of the probability 
that they are members of the same category (i.e., drawn 
from the same statistical distribution). In their model, the 
probability that items share category membership is pro-
portional to the likelihood that they do so given the infor-
mation present in the stimuli per se and to the probability 
that they do so given the observer’s prior experience and 
stored knowledge. When the participants in the present 
experiments performed conceptual similarity judgments, 
there was little information in the stimuli per se on which 
they could base their judgments, so their estimates of the 
probability that stimulus items belonged to the same cat-
egory (and were therefore similar) were likely to depend 
strongly on their prior knowledge, which includes im-
plicit knowledge of the clumpiness principle. By contrast, 
when the participants were performing perceptual simi-
larity judgments, their estimates of the probability that 
stimulus items belonged to the same category were likely 
to depend more strongly on the information given in the 
stimuli themselves, which overwhelmed any influence of 
the clumpiness principle.
Although the difference between the effects of spatial 
proximity on conceptual and perceptual similarity judg-
ments found in Experiments 1 and 2 was not predicted 
a priori, this difference was replicated in the conceptual and 
perceptual judgment conditions in Experiment 3. The com-
parative analysis across experiments confirmed that what 
determined whether proximity made stimuli seem more 
similar or less similar was the type of judgment that the par-
ticipants made (conceptual or perceptual), not the type of 
items that they judged (verbal or pictorial). A question for 
further research is whether the pattern of results discovered 
here might generalize beyond the laboratory. Do we think 
that two politicians are more similar in appearance when 
we see them sitting farther apart, but find their views on the 
issues to be more alike when we see them sitting closer to-
gether? These experiments raise the possibility that spatial 
proximity may subtly influence the similarity judgments we 
make, implicitly or explicitly, in everyday settings.
COnClUSiOnS
Three experiments demonstrated that similarity ratings 
for pairs of words and pictures were influenced systemati-
cally by their spatial separation on the computer screen. In 
all the experiments, similarity judgments were affected by 
task-irrelevant variations in spatial proximity, but not al-
ways as predicted by spatial metaphors in language. When 
the participants made conceptual judgments about abstract 
entities or unseen object properties, stimuli presented closer 
things as members of the same category increases their 
similarity. As Gestalt psychologists have noted, the envi-
ronment is pervasively clumpy: At various scales and lev-
els of abstraction, things that belong to the same category 
tend to be found close together and also tend to be more 
similar to one another than do things that belong to differ-
ent categories (Wertheimer, 1923/1938). We are continu-
ally exposed to the clumping together of things that are 
similar, both in the organization of the natural world and 
in our human-made surroundings. Imagine picking one 
flower in a field of various wildflowers and then picking 
another flower that is either right next to it or one that is 
10 paces away. The closer flower is more likely to belong 
to the same species as the first (i.e., the same category 
of flowers) and, therefore, to be more similar to the first 
than is the flower that is farther away. Where clumping 
does not occur naturally, people often create it: Consider 
the organization of products on supermarket shelves or 
books in a library; clumping can be observed from the 
small-scale arrangement of utensils in the silverware 
drawer to the large-scale distribution of wealth, race, or 
religion across neighborhoods or nations. Implicitly track-
ing this clumpiness may be useful for reasoning about our 
environment in ways that predict contingencies and guide 
behavior (Anderson, 1991; Shepard, 1987; Tenenbaum & 
Griffiths, 2001). Building on Wertheimer’s principles of 
proximity and similarity, it is plausible that people implic-
itly learn and use a set of relationships that could be called 
the clumpiness principle (3):
3. The clumpiness principle: proximity α similarity α
 category membership.
If people use stored knowledge of clumpiness heuristically 
when judging similarity, they should rely on this heuristic 
more when relevant perceptible data are scarce than when 
they are abundant (in which case, such heuristics can be 
ignored in favor of the perceptible information at hand). 
As such, the influence of proximity on similarity that fol-
lows from the heuristic use of the clumpiness principle 
should be particularly relevant for making conceptual 
judgments (as in Experiments 1 and 3, conceptual condi-
tions) but less relevant for making perceptual judgments 
(as in Experiments 2 and 3, perceptual conditions).
On this proposal, proximity exerted two contrasting in-
fluences on similarity judgments in Experiments 1–3. When 
perceptible information was available in the stimuli (and 
was relevant to the task), the participants used it, judging 
closer stimuli to be less similar in Experiments 2 and 3 (per-
ceptual judgment conditions) because proximity encour-
aged noticing small perceptible differences that were less 
noticeable when the stimuli were presented farther apart. 
By contrast, when perceptual information was not available 
in the stimuli (in Experiment 1) or was not relevant to the 
required judgment (in Experiment 3, conceptual judgment 
condition), closer stimuli were judged to be more similar, 
reflecting the participants’ heuristic use of the knowledge 
that, in our clumpy environment, proximity correlates with 
similarity (perhaps mediated by the implicit knowledge that 
proximity also correlates with category membership).
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nOtES
1. This proposal presupposes that primitive representations in abstract 
target domains exist prior to the creation (or elaboration) of cross- domain 
mappings from concrete source domains.
2. The words of each pair were presented serially, rather than simulta-
neously, in order to standardize the amount of time that the participants 
spent on each member of the stimulus pair and also to give the partici-
pants ample time (i.e., 500 msec) to move their eyes from the location of 
the first stimulus to the location of the second, so that they could foveate 
each stimulus in turn. In a pilot version of Experiment 1, abstract nouns 
were presented simultaneously, rather than serially, and remained on the 
screen until the participant responded. Pilot results did not differ signifi-
cantly from the results reported here, which are summarized in Figure 2. 
However, it was not clear from the pilot results what accounted for the 
difference in similarity judgments. In order to constrain the interpreta-
tion of the results reported in this article, the stimuli were presented 
serially. This rules out low-level explanations for observed differences 
in similarity ratings, suggesting that they are not due to differences in 
saccadic activity, peripheral versus foveal viewing of stimuli, or sharing 
of visual attention across the three distance conditions.
3. The results of Experiments 1–3 are presented in normalized form to 
facilitate comparison of effects across experiments.
4. Since all the stimuli were presented serially (see Figure 1), this 
explanation requires that proximity still facilitates noticing small dif-
ferences between stimuli even when members of a pair are never seen 
simultaneously. Although further research is needed to test this assump-
tion, it seems plausible in light of research showing that the spatial 
location of visually presented information is automatically indexed in 
memory and accessed during retrieval, even when the spatial informa-
tion is task irrelevant (e.g., Richardson & Spivey, 2000).
together were judged to be more similar than stimuli pre-
sented farther apart, consistent with predictions based on 
linguistic metaphors linking similarity to physical close-
ness (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). By contrast, when the par-
ticipants made perceptual judgments about visible stimulus 
properties, stimuli presented closer together were judged to 
be less similar than stimuli presented farther apart, contrary 
to predictions based on linguistic metaphors.
These findings underscore the importance of testing 
conceptual metaphor theory experimentally, and sug-
gest that it is not possible to infer the relationship be-
tween similarity and proximity in people’s nonlinguistic 
mental representations solely on the basis of patterns in 
metaphorical language. Even when linguistic metaphors 
failed to predict the exact relationships revealed by be-
havioral tests, however, they still pointed to an under-
explored link between physical space and our abstract 
notion of similarity. Proximity and similarity are not 
unrelated; rather, they appear to be related in more com-
plex ways than linguistic analyses alone can discover. As 
such, linguistic metaphors should be treated as a source 
of hypotheses about the structure of abstract concepts. 
These experiments encourage further exploration of 
relationships between similarity and proximity and of 
how people integrate available perceptual information 
with their implicit knowledge of experiential regularities 
when making similarity judgments.
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